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CHRISTIANITY AND THE LIFE STORY
Brian Scott Ballard
Should we understand our lives as stories? Narrativism answers Yes, a 
view that has recently been the subject of vigorous debate. But what should 
Christian philosophers make of narrativism? In this essay, I  argue that, in 
fact, narrativism is a commitment of Christian teaching. I argue that there 
are practices which Christians have decisive reasons to engage in, which 
require us to see our lives as narratives, practices such as confession and 
thanksgiving.
“Our graves that hide us from the searching sun,” writes Sir Walter 
Raleigh, “Are like drawn curtains when the play is done.” Here, Raleigh 
is invoking a familiar metaphor: Life is a story, and we are its protago-
nists. Over the last forty years, however, many philosophers have come 
to see this as more than a metaphor. Life really is a story, they say, and it 
is important that we come to see it that way. Consider a recent sampling:
What matters most to me about my life story . . . is that I get to write it. Don’t 
like to think I am just performing a script handed to me by history. I prefer to 
think of myself as the scriptwriter, inventing my life as I live it, by living it.1
[O]ur lives exist also in this space of questions, which only a coherent narra-
tive can answer. In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a 
notion of how we have become, and of where we are going.2
[W]e are all virtuoso novelists, who find ourselves engaged in all sorts of 
behaviour, and we always try to put the best ‘faces’ on it we can. We try to 
make all of our material cohere into a single good story. And that story is our 
autobiography. The chief fictional character at the centre of that autobiogra-
phy is one’s self.3
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1Velleman, On Being Me, 44.
2Taylor, Sources of the Self, 47.
3Dennett, “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity,” 114. For views similar to Dennett’s, 
see Bruner, Acts of Meaning; Eakin, Living Autobiographically; McAdams, Power, Intimacy, and 
the Life Story; Schechtman, The Constitution of Selves; and Velleman, “The Self as Narrator.”
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Each of these authors highlights a different good. Velleman highlights 
something like authenticity; Taylor, the intelligibility of one’s life; and 
Dennett, one’s sense of identity. But each author thinks the chosen good 
depends, in part, on our ability to self-narrate, to see our lives as stories 
and to gain some sense of how the story is going. The view that some such 
“existential” good is enhanced, somehow, by our self-narrating we may 
call narrativism.
Although Velleman, Taylor, and Dennett are talking about quite dis-
tinct goods, it is worth seeing their views as variants of a single emerging 
idea. That’s because many of the objections raised against their particular 
views—say, the view that self-narrating is important for a sense of iden-
tity—would apply no matter which good was highlighted. For instance, 
Galen Strawson, a zealous critic of narrativism, argues that autobiograph-
ical memory is too unreliable for self-narrating to be ethically important.4 
And while Strawson is explicitly addressing the idea that self-narrating is 
vital to our sense of self, clearly his point would apply to whatever value 
we attach to self-narrating. So, narrativists, for all their differences, face 
many of the same objections. They also face many of the same burdens 
in formulating their views. For instance, what exactly is narrativity? How 
conscious must we be of our self-narratives? Is self-narrating necessary or 
sufficient (or both) for the relevant good? Is there such thing as the story of 
a life, or can any given life be narrated in dramatically different and even 
conflicting ways? On the face of it, there is no reason in principle to think 
the various narrativists—in spite of their diversity—will end up with dif-
ferent answers to these and other questions. Thus, there is good reason 
to shelter these scattered narrativist views beneath a single program of 
research.5
And scattered they are. Just consider the diverse range of goods 
invoked. In addition to authenticity, intelligibility, and a sense of self—the 
goods already mentioned—grasping life narratives has been said to be 
important for finding meaning,6 for offering forgiveness,7 for reconciling 
with our disappointments,8 for understanding ourselves and others across 
our deepest divides,9 for membership in a community,10 and indeed for 
having any agency at all.11
What should Christians make of this enthusiasm for narrative? Is 
narrativism congruent with Christian values? Or is it perhaps a mere 
fad, an expression of the spirit of the age? After all, the idea that life 
4Strawson, “Against Narrativity.”
5But note that the questions raised here will not be taken up in the present essay.
6Fischer, Our Stories, Chs. 8–10; Kauppinen, “Meaningfulness and time”; Nozick, 
“Happiness”; and Velleman, “Well-Being and Time.”
7Griswald, Forgiveness.
8Rosati, “The Story of a Life.”
9Williams, Truth and Truthfulness.
10Hutto, Folk Psychological Narratives.
11MacIntyre, After Virtue.
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is a story is often one way of saying that there are no ultimate truths, 
only stories, where everyone has a different even if incommensurable 
story to tell. And I take it most Christians will find such pluralism unac-
ceptable. Moreover, the preoccupation with self and authenticity, which 
we find in so many narrativist accounts, seems to reflect a distinctively 
modern and secular individualism, at best alien to the Christian tradi-
tion, at worst allied to our culture’s self-obsession that so many crit-
ics have bemoaned. Indeed, if the ethical or broadly eudaimonistic 
value of self-narrating is some newfangled idea—perhaps a product of 
Romanticism—then any Christian committed to orthodoxy may rightly 
regard it with suspicion.
In spite of these initial reservations, however, the idea that there is 
great value in seeing our lives as narratives, and in giving those narratives 
some articulation, has a profound basis in Christian teaching. Indeed, 
not only does narrativism find support within Christianity; Christianity 
makes it unavoidable. That, at any rate, is what I wish to argue in this essay. 
Christians are rationally committed to narrativism. Call this the commitment 
thesis. By this, I  do not mean that narrativism is a defining doctrine of 
Christianity, or even that it is logically entailed by such doctrines. I mean, 
rather, that if Christianity is true, then we have decisive reasons to nar-
rate our lives, and therefore to view such self-narrating as a good thing. 
This, I claim, is what we should conclude in light of the biblical data and 
Christian tradition.
The commitment thesis is of inherent interest to Christian ethics. If the 
commitment thesis is right, then acquiring some sense of one’s narrative 
is a vital part of Christian living, an insight which has so far been mostly 
ignored, even by so-called narrative theologians (to be discussed shortly). 
But there is another significance of the commitment thesis, which is sim-
ply that narrativism is a substantive commitment. Thus, if narrativism is 
right, that’s confirmation for Christianity; if wrong, disconfirmation. This 
is, then, a place where Christianity sticks its neck out. And accordingly, 
Christian philosophers—not to mention their opponents—have a stake in 
an emerging debate between narrativism and what Strawson calls episodic 
ethics (the denial of narrativism).12 Since this debate has been so far com-
pletely ignored by Christian philosophy, one goal of the present essay is to 
flag this as an area awaiting exploration.
I admit, of course, that the concept of narrative has made its rounds 
in Christian thought and the philosophy of religion more broadly. But 
the idea that narrativism can be supported from within Christianity itself 
remains entirely unexplored. For example, some have argued that the 
Christian narrative is meant to shape the cognitive content of our emo-
tions;13 that narrative can enrich comparative philosophy of religion 
12Strawson, “Episodic Ethics.”
13Roberts, “Joys” and Spiritual Emotions.
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by capturing lived experience within different religious systems;14 that 
narrative can help us deal with familiar skeptical challenges such as the 
argument from evil;15 that Christian moral teaching can be understood 
only in the context of the Christian narrative;16 that narrative has an 
important role to play in Christian apologetics;17 and that it’s in virtue 
of its narrative character that Christianity renders life meaningful.18 But 
nowhere has the concept of narrative figured more prominently than in 
the work of narrative theologians since the 1970s. Now, narrative theol-
ogy covers a hodgepodge of ideas, but all of them orbit around the thesis 
that Christianity is itself a kind of narrative. For instance, Niehbur claims 
that the Christian narrative cannot be fully translated into abstract prin-
ciples, so that attention to its narrative form is required for theologians.19 
Hans Frei claims that Christianity is a sort of cosmic narrative in terms 
of which the believer must come to experience the world and her life in 
it.20 And Stanley Hauerwas claims that the Christian narrative is meant 
to shape the character of the believer in order to allow her to confront her 
own sin without self-deception and unite with others in community.21 In 
claiming this, to be sure, Hauerwas has sometimes expressed the narra-
tivist position. For instance, he says that the self is a narrative;22 at other 
times, that the self is formed by narratives.23 But he relies on philosophical 
arguments—appealing for instance to the work of Alastair MacIntyre—to 
support these narrativist theses, then applies narrativism to Christian eth-
ics.24 In contrast, I wish to consider the support for narrativism from within 
Christianity. In spite of all the buzz about narrative in Christian thought, 
this issue has yet to be explored.25 To what extent does Christianity tell us 
to understand our lives as stories, and to give those stories articulation? 
The commitment thesis answers: to a very great extent. And it must be 
emphasized, this answer is logically independent of all the claims about 
narrative mentioned above.
This essay proceeds as follows. I will examine various Christian prac-
tices and argue they require us to self-narrate. These practices include 
confession (section 1), thanksgiving (section 2), the sharing of personal 
14Burley, “Narrative Philosophy of Religion.”
15Stump, Wandering in Darkness.
16McClendon, “Narrative Ethics and Christian Ethics.”
17McGrath, Narrative Apologetics.
18Seachris, “The Meaning of Life and Scripture’s Redemptive-Historical Narrative” and 
“The Meaning of Life as Narrative.”
19Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation.
20Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative.
21Hauerwas, The Hauerwas Reader, Chs. 8–11.
22Hauerwas, The Hauerwas Reader, 228.
23Hauerwas, The Hauerwas Reader, 233.
24See, for example, Hauerwas, The Work of Theology, Ch. 4.
25Those familiar with the work of Anthony Rudd will know that he has relied on 
Kierkegaard to develop his narrativist views. However, far from deriving his narrativism 
from Kierkegaard’s Christianity, Rudd has been careful precisely to distance the two. See, for 
instance, Rudd, Self, Value, and Narrative, 46.
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testimony (section 3), and the contemplation of the afterlife (section 4). 
Each of these practices is a requirement of Christian moral teaching, the 
only exception being the sharing of personal testimony (the narrative 
of one’s spiritual progress). But while that practice is not required, it is 
something Christians have reasons to do, as I shall argue. Accordingly, my 
argument for the commitment thesis can be understood as follows:
(1) If Christianity is true, we thereby have reason to Φ.
(2) In order to Φ, we must self-narrate.
(3) So, if Christianity is true, we thereby have reason to self-narrate.
A little tinkering is needed to make the argument strictly valid, but that 
its structure is convincing can be seen by the following example which 
mirrors it: If its being my daughter’s birthday gives me a reason to bake 
her a cake, and the only way to do that is to stop by the grocer, then its 
being my daughter’s birthday gives me a reason to stop by the grocer. 
Thus, the only question for us is whether there are Christian practices we 
can plug in for Φ in order to generate true premises. The rest of this essay 
is devoted to arguing there are. Note that the four practices I’ll discuss are 
independently sufficient to establish my verdict, so someone who wishes 
to deny the commitment thesis will have to refute four independent argu-
ments based on the schema above.
1. CONFESSION
Christianity requires that believers confess their sins, the standard means 
by which God’s forgiveness is sought. “If we confess our sins,” John the 
Evangelist tells us, “he is faithful and just and will forgive us our sins and 
purify us from all unrighteousness.”26 For most of Christian history, such 
confession has been practiced as verbal and habitual, and there are good 
reasons for this, reasons internal to Christian teaching, as I will lay out 
shortly. Of course, not all Christian denominations practice confession in 
the same way. But there remains a stable core: describing one’s sins for 
the sake of absolution, as an expression of contrition. This is true whether 
the Christian is a Catholic sitting in a confessional booth, or a Charismatic 
evangelical speaking directly to God.27
Confession obviously has something to do with narrative. In the par-
adigm case, to confess is to narrate some episode of behavior or perhaps 
some pattern of behavior. The narrative need not be especially vivid or 
artful. It can be as simple as “Once, I stole some pears.” Of course, to nar-
rate disparate episodes is hardly to narrate one’s life. It doesn’t even require 
one to see one’s life as a story, for the same reason that a collection of 
261 John 1:9. See also James 5:16, Acts 19:18, and 2 Peter 3:9, just to mention the New 
Testament. All Bible quotes are from the English Standard Version.
27If there is any doubt that unspoken thoughts can be properly considered verbal, see 
Langland-Hassan and Vicente, Inner Speech.
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folktales is not itself a folktale. However, Christian confession asks for 
more than the narration of disparate episodes. Christianity is telling us 
to adopt a narrative orientation towards our past, both near and far; to be 
prepared to make verbal and explicit our behaviors; to be highly reflec-
tive about the inner life that underwrites those behaviors; and crucially, 
to bring to bear on this narrating of behavior and inner life the concepts 
of the gospel—creation, fall, and redemption. Seemingly disparate epi-
sodes are thus brought together in a narrative of God’s grace and human 
need. And the themes of sin and redemption unify them in the mind of 
the believer. For, these themes give the very rationale for confessing in the 
first place. In every act of confession, one invokes the story of the fall, and 
locates one’s life within it, as one more thing in its wreckage; and in every 
hearing of pardon, one hears the story of Christ’s resurrection, in which 
sin and death were overcome, and locates one’s life in its restorative light. 
Confession, then, doesn’t just leave the Christian with a pile of unrelated 
episodes, or “a great barn of facts,” as Bernard Williams put it in another 
context.28 It brings them together in a unified story.
Confession points us to a more fundamental sense in which the 
Christian must narrate her past. For, confession expresses contrition, that 
emotion in which the believer is moved with sorrow over her sin.29 It is 
plausible that contrition, in its outlook, is always narrative. To be contrite 
is to see or somehow grasp one’s actions as culpable, and this requires 
some awareness of what has been done. But to be aware of what has been 
done is to be aware of an event and to have some sense of how it unfolded; 
and that awareness amounts to a narrative, however minimal. Further, if 
one is contrite, one’s action is seen as sinful, and this becomes part of the 
narrative. One sees one’s action in terms of its offensiveness to a God who 
demands right living. And thus, Christian contrition, by its very logic, 
narrates one’s actions using this theological backdrop. The act of confes-
sion makes this narrative explicit, and allows the believer to complete the 
narrative as one in which she is forgiven.
Christianity, then, gives us reasons to feel contrition, and reasons to prac-
tice confession, both of which require self-narrating. These reasons are deci-
sive, since contrition and confession remain central to the Christian life.
Some hold there is a universal need to confess, a need “to speak openly 
about oppressive secrets.”30 Whether that’s so, confessional practices can 
be found in every major religion,31 and to that extent, other religions may 
also require their adherents to narrate their lives. This, however, does not 
conflict with the commitment thesis. If Christianity gives us reasons to 
self-narrate, that doesn’t mean no other religion does.
Is it too restrictive to require that confession is verbal? Imagine some-
one forms a mental picture of her sin, then says in her thoughts, “I am sorry 
28Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, 241.
29For a full analysis of the nature of contrition see Roberts, Spiritual Emotions, Ch. 7.
30Berggren, The Psychology of Confession, 3.
31See the essays in Etzioni and Carney, Repentance.
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for that.” Does this count as verbal? Of course, the demonstrative reference 
is verbal, but the behavior confessed is represented imagistically. Even in 
that case, however, the image is still a representation of what has occurred. So 
this shows, at most, that one can narrate using imagery—hardly surpris-
ing in this age of film and comic books. And if the requirement of verbal 
confession is too strict, it is only because there are, in principle, non-verbal 
ways of self-narrating. Still, verbal self-narrating remains the most natural 
means of confession, because of its ability to recover the nuances of the 
inner life, as I will discuss shortly.
A more serious complication is that I have assumed Christian confession 
to be narrative and habitual. Certain debunkers, however, have claimed 
that confession was not practiced this way until as late as the sixth cen-
tury.32 Before that, confession was not verbal and did not even represent 
the narrative details of one’s past: It was merely acted out through public 
self-humiliation. And it was not habitual: After baptism, the believer only 
got one “second repentance,” and from there, it was exile from the church.
How damaging is this to what I have said so far? Certainly, the early 
church saw vocal defenders of the model of penance just described 
(Tertullian, to mention a prominent example).33 But we should note there 
is evidence of regular, private, verbal confession—the sharing of “bosom 
secrets,” as John Cassian puts it—much earlier than the debunkers admit, 
evidence they seem to be unaware of.34 Further, even non-verbal, perform-
ative confession expresses contrition, which is narrative in its outlook, as 
I have argued. Finally, and most importantly, my claim is that Christian 
confession as it is meant to be practiced involves the believer in self-narration. 
I do not claim it is always practiced as it is meant to be practiced. Indeed, 
in spite of what recent defenders of Tertullian say,35 the biblical data does 
seem to call for confession that is verbal, habitual, and ultimately nar-
rative. There are numerous biblical texts we might cite here, and doubt-
less anyone familiar with the Bible already has some in mind. We might 
mention, for instance, that the Lord’s prayer—which Jesus instructs us 
to use, and presumably more than once or twice—asks for forgiveness of 
“debts” or “trespasses” (opheilēma). But the most decisive point seems to 
be this. Sin is viewed in the New Testament as starting in the depths of the 
inner life. To murder is to think meanly of others. To commit adultery is 
to lust. Those two examples are particularly relevant, because Tertullian 
himself singles out murderers and adulterers as not to be readmitted to 
32Foucault, “Christianity and Confession”; Mortimer, The Origins of Private Penance in the 
Western Church; Taylor, The Culture of Confession from Augustine to Foucault; Tentler, Sin and 
Confession on the Eve of the Reformation.
33See Coxe, On Repentance. See also Kimmel, “Comparative Confession,” who brings out 
just how distinctive Tertullian’s view is compared with other approaches to penance.
34See Oakley, Celtic Penance, “The Origins of Irish Penitential Discipline,” and “The 
Origins of Private Penance in the Western Church.” See also Watkins, A History of Penance, 
447–448.
35Notably, Osborn, Tertullian, Ch. 8.
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the church. But it is hard to believe that many congregants—or any, for 
that matter—will be able to go for long without committing such inward 
sins. In protecting the church, then, Tertullian merely empties it. But while 
the New Testament expects the church to be pure, it also expects there 
to be a church. Thus, confession will have to be habitual, since thoughts 
and desires will frequently stray into sin. And confession will have to be 
verbal, since there is no other viable way for thoughts and desires to be 
expressed with the detail and regularity that confession calls for.36
This last point is worth elaborating in light of another fairly natural objec-
tion: Must Christian confession narrate the particulars of what one has done 
(or thought, or felt, or wanted)? Must it even narrate events at all? Certainly, 
there are many examples of Christian confessions that are highly generic, 
as the Lord’s prayer already illustrates. Likewise, Samuel Johnson records 
the following sort of confession not infrequently in his diary: “Forgive, O 
merciful Lord, whatever I have done contrary to thy laws.”37
I grant there is a place for such confessions, which acknowledge our 
general status as sinners before God, and which admit to sins beyond 
our awareness. But two features of Christian thought, taken together, 
require the believer to go beyond these generic confessions and articu-
late the details of his moral failures, at least with some kind of regular-
ity. The first feature is that the self is seen as capacious, containing hidden 
depths. Jeremiah writes, “The heart is deceitful above all things, and des-
perately sick; who can understand it?”38 And the Psalmist cries, “Search 
me, O God, and know my heart! Try me and know my thoughts! And see 
if there be any grievous way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting!”39, 
40 The second feature is that the believer is urged to examine this capacious 
inner life, and charged with moral responsibility for its contents. He must 
“take every thought captive.”41 He must “examine himself.”42 He must 
“test his own work.”43, 44 And putting these two features together, we see 
36I mention thoughts and desires, mental states rather than behaviors. But even where it is 
mental states being confessed, the believer is still narrating, since mental states are events no 
less than behaviors are. Coveting the donkey of one’s neighbor is as much an event as stealing 
it. For, even when such coveting is a standing disposition, the disposition will be something 
to confess only if made occurrent in consciousness.
37Johnson, The Works of Samuel Johnson, 138.
38Jer. 17:9.
39Ps. 139:23–24.
40It’s worth adding that this capacious self is a theme Augustine worries repeatedly in his 
Confessions, that “man is a great depth,” that one can hardly number the feelings of his heart, 
that the self can be lost even to itself, because it is a thing more boundless than the seas and 
the mountains. For notable discussion of this feature of Augustine’s thought, see Brown, 
Augustine of Hippo, 178–179; Misch, History of Autobiography in Antiquity, 633–646; and Olney, 




44This Christian variant of know thyself would figure in Christian ethics throughout the 
centuries. In his On the Trinity, for instance, Augustine writes that the knowledge of oneself 
213CHRISTIANITY AND THE LIFE STORY
that the Christian is made responsible for examining a complex and con-
toured inner world. Such examination will strive to be—it will fail, but 
it will strive to be—as sophisticated as the heart it searches. And when 
that examining turns up sinful movements in thought and desire, as it 
inevitably will, these will need to be confessed. Typically, that will mean a 
detailed rather than generic confession, given the complex nature of what 
is being confessed. But even if the confession remains generic—“forgive 
me, Father, for I have sinned”—it will at any rate be spurred on by a rich 
and intricate recognition of events in one’s inner life, a recognition that is 
narrative in its shape for the very reason that it is a recognition of events. 
That is why Christianity calls for more than merely generic confession.
Where does this leave us? Christian morality requires contrition and 
confession, both of which narrate the believer’s life. For, contrition requires 
narrative representation of one’s acts as sinful. And confession should be 
understood—in the typical case—as verbal and habitual, making explicit 
the narrative of one’s past about which one feels contrition. And since con-
fession is habitual, it thus involves the believer in narrating many events 
of her life, including her inner life. But she does not merely narrate them 
as unrelated episodes. Rather, she narrates them as a sinner in need of 
redemption, and thus these episodes are unified thematically in a broader 
narrative of sin and grace.
2. THANKSGIVING
The Psalmist tells us:
Enter his gates with thanksgiving, and his courts with praise! Give thanks 
to him; bless his name!
For the Lord is good; his steadfast love endures forever, and his faithfulness 
to all generations.45
This call to thanksgiving can be found throughout the Bible. But if 
Christianity calls for thanksgiving, it is because it first calls for grati-
tude. Following Roberts,46 we may say that to feel gratitude is to under-
stand47 oneself as (a) having received a benefit which is (b) undeserved 
is to be preferred to the knowledge of the natural sciences (Augustine, On the Trinity, 129). 
While some have argued that this is an inheritance from Stoicism (see Misch, History of 
Autobiography in Antiquity, Vol. 2, 404–413), what I have emphasized here is that the logic for 
self-examination is internal to the Christian worldview, which sees the self as both elusive 
yet responsible even for its hidden depths.
45Ps. 100:4–5.
46Roberts, “The Blessings of Gratitude.”
47Roberts’s preferred term is not understanding but construal (Roberts, Emotions), though 
he thinks construal is a kind of understanding. Other theorists of emotion prefer perception 
or something analogous. For a recent sample of this debate, see Ballard, “Content and the 
Fittingness of Emotion”; Milona, “Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously”; and Prinz, 
Gut Reactions. Presently, of course, nothing hangs on these details, although I am taking for 
granted that emotions involve some manner of evaluative outlook, rather than being brute 
sensations.
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and (c)  offered deliberately by a beneficiary who (d) has your good in 
mind. That is the outlook of gratitude, but gratitude involves more than 
an outlook, for it possesses a characteristic motivation, a felt desire to do 
something. Specifically, one wants to show or express one’s gratitude, and 
where this can take the form of favors returned, more direct is thanksgiv-
ing—outright verbal expression. To give thanks is simply to say, more or 
less, “thank you for . . .” (where this utterance functions as an expression 
of gratitude rather than some point of courtesy).
Gratitude is the Christian emotion par excellence. The central event of 
Christianity—the death and resurrection of Jesus—is seen as conferring 
an undeserved benefit (salvation, or at least, its possibility) offered by a 
beneficiary (God) for our good. But aside from this momentous salvation 
event, the Christian also views herself as the beneficiary of many other 
undeserved blessings wrought by Providence. She is urged to see many 
things in her life as gifts from God, where this is no mere façon de parler. 
When Samuel Pepys, in his famous diaries, thanks God for his health and 
his marriage and the peace of England, he is doing just what James sug-
gests, when his epistle tells us that “every good gift and every perfect gift 
is from above, coming down from the Father of lights.”48
Gratitude and thanksgiving are the positive analogues of contrition 
and confession. And like confession, thanksgiving involves the believer in 
self-narration. She is to keep watch over her life in search of God’s bless-
ings. She is to make His blessings explicit—that is to say, verbal—to her-
self, to others, and to the Beneficiary. And to do this, to give thanks, means 
narrating events, narrating the occasion of one’s gratitude.
Is it possible to give thanks for something without narrating it? For one, 
perhaps thanksgiving can be performed non-narratively. In fact, that is just 
what the ancient Israelites seem to be doing in the thanksgiving sacrifice.49 
Yet, such thanksgiving is still expressive of gratitude; and gratitude, like 
contrition, has an essentially narrative character. This is true even in cases 
of gratitude apparently devoid of narrativity. Suppose I am grateful there 
are redwood trees on my front lawn. Here, my gratitude is about a state 
of affairs that involves no change, no event, and thus nothing to narrate. 
In that case, when I say, “thank you, Lord, for those redwood trees on my 
front lawn,” am I really narrating? Quite simply, Yes, although the narra-
tive may not be explicit. By the very logic of gratitude, one is grateful for 
gifts—things that have been given. Thus, if I am grateful to God for the 
redwoods, then I am seeing them—in some sense of “seeing”—as given 
by Him. And giving is an event. Narration of events is thus inherent in 
gratitude, because gratitude is always about what has been given. Thus, 
even where thanksgiving is merely performative, it is still expressing a 
narrative outlook.
48James 1:17. Of course, the command to give thanks can be seen throughout the New 
Testament, as in Co. 3:17, Eph. 5:20, and 1 Thess. 5:18.
49Lev. 7:12.
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Since gratitude has a narrative character, it is no accident that in the 
Christian autobiographical tradition, gratitude is often presented as both 
the occasion of the writing and its unifying theme, if we take what the 
authors say at face value. Augustine is thanking God from the first book 
of his Confessions, and affirms in his Retractions that praising God for His 
works was a primary motive for writing his life.50 Margery Kempe tells us 
that her narrative describes “his wonderful works, how mercifully, how 
benignly, and how charitably he moved and stirred a sinful wretch to his 
love.”51 Teresa of Ávila writes for “His glory and praise.”52 John Bunyan, 
quoting Psalm 78, wants to tell us of the Lord’s “wondrous works,” in 
order that “the goodness and bounty of God towards me, may be the more 
advanced and magnified before the sons of men.”53 Mary Rowlandson, a 
New England woman who survived captivity by American Indians, hes-
itated to publish her account, “yet her gratitude unto God made her not 
hardly persuadable to let it pass, that God might have his due glory.”54 
This list could be extended substantially.
Not only, then, does Christian gratitude require us to narrate certain 
goods as given by God, but it has long been recognized as the occasion for 
doing so, a need felt so urgently that it has literally determined the course 
of Western literature (speaking of autobiography, itself a major influence 
on the realistic novel). Of course, if some Christians have written auto-
biographies as acts of thanksgiving, that doesn’t mean all thanksgiving 
requires such intricate and demanding narration. After all, Christianity is 
for everyone, including—perhaps especially—the illiterate poor. But even 
verbal acts of thanksgiving far simpler than spiritual autobiographies are 
still ultimately narrative. A sentence as simple as “thank you, Lord, for 
this food”—if it is an expression of gratitude rather than mere routine—is 
an act of narration, albeit in shorthand. It says: Here is some food, which 
I  have not deserved but which God has provided for my good. The object of 
Christian gratitude, then, even one’s dinner, is seen as part of the sacred 
story of God’s provision and our creaturehood.
To sum up, the Christian has decisive reasons to feel gratitude, an emo-
tion which narrates events as given by God. And the Christian has deci-
sive reasons to practice thanksgiving on a habitual basis, which expresses 
her gratitude. Further, she has strong reasons—not decisive, but strong—
to practice her thanksgiving verbally, expressing directly the narrative 
embedded in her gratitude. Such narrative thanksgiving is not required, 
because thanksgiving can in principle be performed or acted out, as 
in the sacrifices of ancient Israel. But the believer does have reasons to 
50Augustine, The Retractions, 130.
51Kempe, The Book of Margery Kempe, 34.
52Teresa of Avila, The Life of Saint Teresa of Avila by Herself, 21.
53Bunyan, Grace Abounding, 6.
54Rowlandson, The Sovereignty and Goodness of God, 66.
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give verbal, narrative thanksgiving, because (a) it is a natural mode of 
self-expression, (b) it is modeled by numerous figures in the Bible and 
Christian tradition, and (c) it allows the believer to celebrate the particulars 
of what God has done in a way that non-verbal, performative thanksgiv-
ing cannot. And crucially, such verbal thanksgiving—and the gratitude 
it expresses—narrates the events of the believer’s life but does not leave 
them unconnected. It binds them, for the believer, under the theme of 
God’s providential care, and sets them against the narrative backdrop of 
an ongoing relationship with a God who made Himself providential in the 
very act of creating dependent animals like us.
3. THE SHARING OF PERSONAL TESTIMONY
One would not have to spend much time at an evangelical church in 
America before hearing someone “share her testimony.” By this conven-
tion, the believer tells her life story, organized around her coming to know 
and follow God. Such stories are often formulated as conversion narra-
tives in which a dramatic encounter with God divides one’s life into before 
and after. But they may also be stories in which she has simply always 
believed in God, as far as she can recall, and what gets narrated are the 
challenges she has faced as a believer and the ways God has helped her 
overcome them. Doubtless, too, other sorts of testimonies can be heard.
Is this practice of sharing one’s testimony a quirk of American evangel-
icalism? Tanya Lurhmann, who studies evangelicals as an anthropologist, 
tells us this emphasis on personal testimony is part of a “major shift” in 
American Christianity.55 Evangelicals today, she explains, are drawn to 
personal testimonies and share them openly because “they are the enact-
ment of a relationship between a creature and his creator, between a dull, 
cautious, skeptical human, and a loving, patient, persistent God.”56 Now, 
philosophers might wonder whether enactment is the right word there. 
But I wish instead to note that the use of personal testimony has a his-
tory far more ancient than Lurhmann suggests.57 Bruce Hindmarsh, for 
example, identifies a similar before-and-after conversion narrative emerg-
ing by the 17th c.58 And the use of personal spiritual narratives—setting 
aside the strictly conversion-centered—goes back much farther than that. 
Christians have been using hagiography for spiritual edification since the 
4th c., when Athanasius penned The Life of Saint Antony, a work prefigured 
by martyr narratives such as The Martyrdom of Polycarp in the middle of 
the 2nd c., itself prefigured by the New Testament’s use of exemplary lives 
of faith, as in Heb. 11. It is in the 2nd c., too, that we find the beginnings 
55Lurhmann, When God Talks Back, xvi.
56Ibid, 9.
57But to be fair, Lurhmann is aware that there have been other periods of Christianity when 
the personal character of faith has been emphasized, as in the various “Great Awakenings” in 
the American 19th c. (Lurhmann, When God Talks Back, 14).
58Hindmarsh, The Evangelical Conversion Narrative.
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of Christian autobiography in the work of Justin Martyr. And Christian 
autobiography will define life writing in the West at least until the 19th 
c., a thing worth emphasizing. Quite simply, Christian autobiography 
is the single most salient influence on life writing in the West.59 And the 
Christian’s drive to write autobiographically has thus animated a major 
segment of Western cultural life.
What, then, is behind this drive? It can be understood in terms of three 
salient motives: (a) to give thanks for what God has done, (b) to evangelize 
to the unconverted, and (c) to edify the church.60 These three motives also 
seem to be salient in the contemporary practice of sharing one’s testimony. 
Thus, the use of testimony, far from being an idiosyncrasy of American 
evangelicalism, is an ancient practice rooted in Christian tradition and the 
Bible. I  will argue this by elaborating on (b) and (c), since enough has 
already been said concerning (a) in the previous section.
Evangelism—sharing the message of Christianity in order to effect 
someone’s conversion—has made use of personal testimony from early 
59Of course, the beginnings of modern autobiography, shorn as it is of any spiritual moti-
vations, can be traced to Rousseau’s Confessions, published in 1782. But this work was met 
with revulsion by many critics on the very basis of its lacking spiritual motivations. Even 
Descartes’s quasi-autobiographical works, though far from spiritual, at least used the con-
fessional mode as a device for furthering inquiry. It would not be until the 19th c. that audi-
ences would get used to the idea of an autobiography purely devoted to putting the self on 
display. Indeed, such reticence in publishing one’s life for its own sake—the sense that to do 
so is somehow deeply inappropriate—is fairly common, even in widely differing contexts. 
Consider, for instance, Medieval China, where autobiographical writing was highly medi-
ated, even obscured, by artifice designed to manage this reticence (Wang, “Medieval Chinese 
Autobiographical Writing”). These connections are worth noting, since, I believe, they sug-
gest there is a sort of natural norm against publishing the self, one which Christianity offers 
special license for suspending, thus making possible the Western autobiographical tradi-
tion. I don’t mean to suggest, as Georges Gusdorf once did, that autobiography is somehow 
uniquely Western (Gusdorf, “Conditions and Limits of Autobiography”). Indeed, that notion 
is beset by counterexamples on all sides, for instance, from ancient Egypt (Misch, History of 
Autobiography in Antiquity, Vol. 1), or classical China (Wu, The Confucian’s Progress), or the 
Arab world (Reynolds, Interpreting the Self), or Tibetan Buddhism (Roesler, “Between Self-
Expression and Convention”). These make for fascinating comparison with Christian autobi-
ographies—for example, some Tibetan writers narrate their past lives—but such comparison 
is of course a work of its own, as is the tracing of Christianity’s influence on this genre. What 
is evident, however, is that the desire to write one’s life is fairly widespread, as are the norms 
that push against that desire and whose suspension in the West is largely due to Christianity.
60I think a fourth motive can be discerned, which is simply to celebrate, to relish, what 
God has done in the believer’s life. This is distinguished from thanksgiving because, in cele-
bration, one’s status as a recipient of an underserved gift is not salient. Rather, what is salient 
is simply the goodness of the gift itself. For example, Mary Rowlandson regards her account 
as a “memorandum of God’s dealings with her, that she might never forget, but remember 
the same, and the severall circumstances thereof, all the dayes of her life” (Rowlandson, The 
Sovereignty and Goodness of God, 65). This echoes the sentiment found in many Psalms, which 
exhort us to remember the “wondrous works” of God, often referring to Israel’s sacred his-
tory, but other times quite clearly referring to the personal life of the Psalmist. However, 
since space is limited, and since this motive for sharing personal testimony is quite similar to 
that of thanksgiving—already discussed in section 2—I won’t rely on it in my argument here.
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on. Justin Martyr offers a clear example. His Dialogue with Trypho, writ-
ten between 155 and 161, records a debate that took place in 135 between 
Justin and a Jewish activist. A Christian apologetic aimed at Judaism, the 
work begins by recounting Justin’s own conversion upon realizing the 
inadequacy of Platonism. Here we have an early example of evangelistic 
testimony. And yet the earliest examples are found in the ministry of the 
Apostle Paul. In Acts 22, when Paul stands before the crowd of Jewish 
leaders who have dragged him from the temple in Jerusalem, he recounts 
his entire conversion narrative, from his time as Saul of Tarsus, through 
the road to Damascus and healing at the hands of Ananias. He does the 
same in Acts 26, before King Agrippa. In both cases, he is using personal 
testimony to reach the unconverted (King Agrippa responds, basically, 
“do you seriously expect me to become a Christian right now?”). Thus, to 
the extent that we are to treat Paul as an exemplar of the faith—and this 
is encouraged explicitly, for instance, in 1 Cor. 11:1 and 2 Thess. 3:7–9—
we, too, have reason to make use of personal testimony in an evange-
listic context, a practice which can be seen as an extension of the New 
Testament’s general focus on first-hand accounts in the defense of Christ’s 
messiahship.61
If evangelism has motivated the use of personal testimony, all the more 
has the edification of the church. Outside the Bible, the earliest example 
we have is from The Passion of Perpetua and Felicity,62 an autobiographical 
account of St. Perpetua’s awaiting martyrdom. Written at the start of the 
3rd c., it opens:
If the old examples of the faith, which testify to the grace of God and lead 
to the edification of men, were written down so that by reading them God 
should be honored and man comforted—as if through a reexamination of 
those deeds—should we not set down new acts that serve each purpose 
equally? For these too will some day also be venerable and compelling for 
future generations, even if at the present time they are judged to be of lesser 
importance, due to the respect naturally afforded the past.63
While this purpose for writing is not stated by Perpetua herself—the 
introductory paragraph is written by a redactor—it is significant that this 
is how one of her Christian contemporaries understood the value of her 
account. Likewise, in the 4th c., Gregory of Nazianzus offers his autobio-
graphical poem to the young
61According to Alison Trites, “witness” and its cognates occurs over 200 times in the New 
Testament, the disciples bearing witness to Christ’s messiahship as if a court drama were 
unfolding in which Christ’s identity were the contested issue (Trites, The New Testament 
Concept of Witness). We find this sort of thing, for instance, in 2 Peter 1:16: “For we did not 
follow cleverly devised myths when we made known to you the power and coming of our 
Lord Jesus Christ, but we were eyewitnesses of his majesty.”
62While the historicity of this text has been disputed, it is vigorously defended in 
Heffernan, The Passion of Perpetua and Felicity, 5–6. If historical, it is the earliest writing we 
possess by a Christian woman.
63Heffernan, The Passion of Perpetua and Felicity, 125 (my italics).
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as a kind of pleasant medicine,
an inducement which might lead them to more useful things,
skilfully sweetening the harshness of the commandments:
for a taut bowstring also needs to be relaxed.64
Similar examples abound. Augustine hopes that his Confessions will “rouse 
up the heart and prevent it from sinking into the sleep of despair,”65 that 
it will “lift up the understanding and affection of men to Him.”66 Angela 
of Foligno writes her life story “in order to increase the devotion of His 
people.”67 The scribe for Julian of Norwich’s Shewings is sure that “in this 
vision are very many comforting and greatly moving words for all those 
who desire to be lovers of Christ.”68 Margery Kempe expects her Book to 
be “a comforting one for sinful wretches.”69 St. Ignatius, in dictating his 
life, was encouraged that “he could do nothing of greater benefit for the 
Society [of Jesuits].”70 Mary Rowlandson writes to “enlarge pious hearts 
in the praises of God.”71 And John Bunyan, addressing his congregation, 
publishes his life “for your further edifying,” in hopes that “others may 
be put in remembrance of what he hath done for their souls, by reading 
his work upon me.”72 No doubt, further examples can be found. But here 
again, they are not limited to extra-biblical texts. Paul himself, although he 
doesn’t write full-blown autobiography, uses his life story for the church’s 
edification. In Acts 20:17–38, as he prepares to leave Ephesus, Paul reminds 
the elders of his ministry with them, in order to encourage them in the true 
faith. And in Phil. 1:12–14, Paul describes his imprisonments to embolden 
the church in the preaching of the gospel. And in 1 Tim. 1:12–19, Paul 
reminds Timothy of the grace Paul has received, so that the young disciple 
may “fight the battle well.” In Paul, then, we find someone who made free 
use of his personal testimony to build up the church wherever he saw fit.
What Paul is doing in displaying his life story, what Bunyan and 
Augustine and Perpetua are doing, is not something fundamentally dif-
ferent from what a modern-day Christian does when she stands up in 
church and shares how God has changed her life. The same motives of 
thanksgiving, edification, and evangelism remain salient across the centu-
ries. Thus, rather than seeing the practice of testimony as an idiosyncrasy 
of American evangelicalism, we should view it as something with deep 
roots in Christian tradition. It is, I  grant, not something Christians are 
required to do, as they are confession and thanksgiving. Nevertheless, it 
64White, Gregory of Nazianzus, 5.
65Augustine, On the Trinity, 203.
66Augustine, The Retractions, 130.
67Mazzoni, Angela of Foligno’s Memorial, 23.
68Norwich, Revelations of Divine Love, 3.
69Kempe, The Book of Margery Kempe, 34.
70Loyola, The Autobiography of St. Ignatius, 17.
71Rowlandson, The Sovereignty and Goodness of God, 66.
72Bunyan, Grace Abounding, 4.
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is something which they have reasons to do. And it is a practice that obvi-
ously requires robust self-narration, because it simply is self-narration.
4. CONTEMPLATION OF THE AFTERLIFE
In one of his finest passages, Richard Baxter advises that
[t]o conceive of God and glory, only as above our conception, will beget but 
little love; or as above our love, will produce little joy. Therefore put Christ 
no farther from you, than he hath put himself, lest the Divine nature be again 
inaccessible. Think of Christ, as in our own glorified nature. Think of glori-
fied saints, as men made perfect. Suppose thyself a companion with John in 
his survey of the New Jerusalem, and viewing the thrones, the Majesty, the 
heavenly hosts, the shining splendor, which he saw.73
We mustn’t merely think of heaven in the abstract, Baxter says, but must 
imagine it concretely enough that we feel the appropriate emotions. Here, 
Baxter is only elaborating on a piece of the Christian life practiced in 
earnest for centuries and held out in the Bible for all to see, the practice 
of contemplating one’s heavenly future. And this practice, I will argue, 
requires self-narration.
Christian teaching on the afterlife, in brief, is that those who trust in 
Christ will be raised from the dead and will enjoy an everlasting (or is it 
eternal?) period of bliss, dwelling with the saints and being at last restored 
to that union with God for which we were meant. By “heaven,” I am refer-
ring to this picture, rather than some Platonic realm of disembodied harp-
ists. Of course, in spite of an ancient tradition of universal salvation, much 
of Christian theology has taught that, for the many who persist in rejecting 
God, something far less pleasant awaits. Still, it is the Christian’s heavenly 
future which Baxter is telling his readers to envision, for that future is the 
basis of a hope that has long been regarded as a core Christian virtue.74
Certainly, many Christians have done what Baxter suggests, reflect-
ing quite deliberately on the details of heaven. Some of this reflection is 
literary, amplifying the biblical imagery, as we find in Dante and Milton 
and the Pearl poet and other luminaries.75 And some of this reflection is 
philosophical. The early church, in spite of all its troubles, spent enor-
mous energy in articulating the theological details of heaven—such as the 
nature of the resurrected body—and in defending the credibility of that 
picture, a project that continues today.76
73Baxter, The Saints’ Everlasting Rest, 316. Thanks to Wayne Alder for bringing this passage 
to my attention years ago.
74Roberts, Spiritual Emotions, Ch. 10.
75McGrath’s A Brief History of Heaven offers a useful survey of literary depictions of heaven.
76For a survey of ancient attempts to grapple with this, see Daley, The Hope of the Early 
Church. For a sampling of the contemporary discussion, see Davis, After We Die; Walls, 
Heaven; and Van Inwagen, “I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead.”
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This enthusiasm for reflection on the afterlife has a solid basis in 
the Bible, where the contemplation of heaven is seen as a vital piece of 
Christian living. Like Baxter, Paul urges:
If then you have been raised with Christ, seek the things that are above, 
where Christ is, seated at the right hand of God. Set your minds on things 
that are above, not on things that are on earth. For you have died, and your 
life is hidden with Christ in God. When Christ who is your life appears, then 
you also will appear with him in glory.77
By things above, Paul does not just mean Christian ideals. He means, liter-
ally, where Christ is, seated at the right hand of God. It is heaven, our appear-
ing in glory, which we are exhorted zēteite (to seek, search for, desire, 
require, demand) and phroneite (to think, observe, direct the mind upon). 
And that only scratches the surface, for there are many other biblical texts 
that invoke heaven as something to keep in view.78
All that is to say: The believer has decisive reasons to contemplate her 
heavenly future. But what exactly is the believer doing, in contemplating 
this? She isn’t just picturing some final state of the cosmos. She is picturing 
the final state of her life. She is picturing the end of her story, or at least, the 
story of her earthly existence.79 And to do this, to see heaven as the end of 
one’s life, is thereby to see one’s life as a narrative and to have some view 
of its final chapter. In contemplating heaven, then, the believer narrates 
her life.
One’s heavenly future—that final chapter—has a tight narrative con-
nection to one’s present, not only because they are causally related, but 
also because they are thematically related. The problems one faces here 
on earth, the troubles and pains that make for that “miserable condi-
tion of Man,” as Donne lamented, are promised to be worked out in that 
heavenly future, where every tear is wiped away, where the desires of 
our hearts are satisfied. And this is plausibly seen as a form of narrative 
closure. Noel Carroll argues that narrative closure is what occurs when all 
the questions that a narrative saliently poses are answered.80 Well, one’s 
present life poses many questions. Every problem poses the question of 
whether it will be solved; every wrong, whether it will be made right. 
And the doctrine of heaven gives an answer: Yes, by the power of God, it 
77Col. 3:1–4. Thanks to Wayne Alder for insightful discussion of this text.
78To offer just a few examples, see 1 Cor. 2:9, Heb. 11:16, Matt. 6:19–21, 2 Peter 3:13, and 
1 Tim. 6:17–19.
79This qualifier is needed because some take seriously the prospect that in some sense 
one’s narrative continues into the afterlife, that something like a journey takes place into 
the depths of God. This picture is given literary treatment in Lewis, The Great Divorce, and 
Tolkien, “Leaf by Niggle,” and taken quite seriously by theologians such as Origen (Daley, 
The Hope of the Early Church, 50). On this view, we should see our entrance to heaven as the 
ending of one’s earthly narrative, but the beginning of a different narrative. (And there is no 
inconsistency there. It is well-known that a single event can play different roles in different 
narratives.)
80Carroll, “Narrative Closure.”
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will. Not just for the world, but for the individual believer. Thus, for the 
Christian, not only does heaven end her story; it gives her story satisfying 
closure as well.
The point is worth amplifying. We are told that the blessings of this life 
are but a shadow of things to come.81 The good of heaven in some sense 
flows out of the present. Indeed, that heaven is not just some place where 
things happen to be good, that it is rather where the bad is made right, was 
widely noted by early theologians. Gregory of Nyssa thought there was a 
yearning all people had—“a common movement in all souls”—for the life 
that heaven offers.82 Augustine tells us that the world will be “remade” 
and so will we,83 and elsewhere, that in reaching heaven, the Christian 
has finally returned to that “homeland” which he has sought in all his 
wanderings.84 And Origen tells us that “the end is always like the begin-
ning.”85 In short, as Brian Daley puts it, Christian eschatology means faith 
“in the resolution of the unresolved, in the tying up of all the loose ends 
that mar the life of the believer in the world.”86 Indeed, in the remarks 
quoted above, we may distinguish three senses in which heaven ties up 
the loose ends. First, in heaven, the partial goods of this earth are brought 
to fullness. Second, in heaven, our deepest yearnings are fulfilled. Third, 
in heaven, suffering and evil are set right. These are three senses in which 
there is a thematic and therefore narrative connection between heaven and 
the present life. But if heaven is a future narratively connected to one’s life 
now, then one’s life now becomes a narrative in virtue of that very connec-
tion. And to see heaven as the ending of one’s life is to grasp one’s life as a 
narrative in that very act of seeing.
Imagine someone who lives entirely in the present. His consciousness 
encompasses little of past or future; he is wholly absorbed in the demands 
of the day. Further, he does not experience his life as belonging to a single 
enduring self. That youth, that boy from thirty years ago, staring back at 
him from the photograph—he hardly knows him. He feels no connection 
psychologically to that past. But now imagine that such an “episodic,” as 
Strawson would call him, sets his mind on things above. Suddenly, he is 
aware of his present, this day, this hour, this man he has become, as stand-
ing in relation to a future. And that man in the future shall be him, the same 
man, for it is he who shall be resurrected and who shall see the face of God. 
His storyless present is suddenly opened out into a narrative. For, his pres-
ent is now, as he sees it, standing in causal and thematic relations to his 
future, a future in clear view. They are causal relations because the one leads 
to the other. They are thematic relations because the problems of the one are 
resolved in the other, the yearnings of the past man projected as fulfilled.
81Heb. 10:1.
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To sum up, then, Christian moral teaching requires the believer to con-
template her heavenly destiny, not just to think about it but to wrap her 
emotions around it, to be shaped by the hope of heaven.87 But, psycholog-
ically speaking, this means she is seeing her life as a narrative and getting 
the end in view, an ending which gives profound closure, perhaps maxi-
mal closure, to the story she has lived.
5.  CONCLUSION
Narrativism—the view that it is ethically important, in some way, to 
see one’s life as a story and to gain some sense of what the story is—has 
emerged in moral philosophy as a matter of contention. In light of this, it 
is significant that Christianity, if true, commits us to narrativism. My argu-
ment for this is that certain practices, which Christians have reasons to 
engage in—decisive reasons, in some cases—require the Christian to nar-
rate her life. These practices include confession, thanksgiving, the sharing 
of personal testimony, and the contemplation of the afterlife. Thus, the 
Christian’s reasons for engaging in these practices are also reasons for nar-
rating her life in the ways these practices require.
I’ll end by suggesting four further avenues worthy of exploration, 
though their full treatment will obviously require works of their own. 
Here I merely gesture at them.
First, a further practice worth considering is the remembrance of sacred 
history. It is surprising just how underexplored this practice is in Christian 
ethics, given its centrality in scripture. All through the Bible, we are told 
to remember God’s works, to recall the sacred history of Israel, to bear in 
mind the price paid on the cross. We are exhorted not only to remember 
these things but to relate them to our present. And if we do this, we are seeing 
these distant events as narratively relevant to our own stories, which is 
to say, we are giving ourselves a far richer narrative past than we would 
otherwise possess, not to mention a past we share collectively. And thus 
we are again involved in self-narration. For just as the contemplation of 
one’s heavenly destiny narrates our lives by giving them a future, so the 
remembrance of sacred history narrates our lives by giving them a past.
Second, it’s worth considering how this might apply to recent Christian 
apologetics. If it really is important for us to narrate our lives, then this 
psychological or ethical need for narration is something Christianity pro-
vides powerful resources for dealing with, as my case so far has illus-
trated. For, Christianity, being itself a master narrative, gives us the terms 
with which to frame our own lesser narratives. We’re told to paint, yes, 
but we’re also given a pallet full of colors. This would be, then, one sense 
in which Christianity supports our flourishing. Accordingly, perhaps we 
87This distinction between merely knowing and deeply feeling, so vital to the Christian life, is 
explored in Ballard, “The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience”; Roberts, Spiritual 
Emotions; and Roberts and Wood, Intellectual Virtues, 53.
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have the materials here for a kind of existential argument for faith,88 or 
perhaps an argument for pro-theism in the emerging debate over the axi-
ology of God.89
Third, there is the issue of narrativism itself. I mentioned at the outset 
a number of problems facing the view. Can Christianity help here? For 
instance, Strawson objects, as noted, that autobiographical memory is too 
unreliable to be ethically important. And though I have space only to be 
suggestive, it seems to me the Christian has something to say here. For the 
story of our lives is not one we alone are responsible for narrating. There is 
a Great Author. Thus, while we must maintain that we have, or can have, 
some grip on the details of our narratives, we may rest assured that God 
knows the true story of our lives, however it may elude us. And we may 
trust it is a story of redemption, for that is what has been promised, even if 
the faultiness of autobiographical memory prevents us from recovering its 
details in anything approaching fullness. There is at least one sense, there-
fore, in which the Christian is better positioned to endorse narrativism.
Finally, what of the worry that narrativism encourages self-absorption 
or reflects our unfettered individualism? We can see now that, while this 
may be a problem, it needn’t be. For the narrative practices described 
here are means of aligning with God. Thus, when the Christian—by giv-
ing thanks, by confessing, and so on—grasps her life as a story, she does 
not merely grasp it as her own, does not tell it for its own sake, but is 
led through it to redemption. “We tell ourselves stories in order to live,” 
writes Joan Didion.90 And she was right in more ways than she intended. 




Augustine. 1963. On the Trinity. Translated by Stephen  McKenna (Catholic 
University of America Press).
Augustine. 2001. The Confessions of St. Augustine. Translated by Rex Warner (Signet 
Classic).
Augustine. 1968. The Retractions. Translated by Bogen  Mary  Inez (Catholic 
University of America Press).
88Ballard, “The Rationality of Faith and the Benefits of Religion”; Craig, Reasonable Faith, 
Ch. 2; Williams, Existential Reasons for Belief in God.
89Kahane, “Should We Want God to Exist?”; Kraay, “Invitation to the Axiology of Theism.”
90Didon, The White Album, 11.
91For generous discussion of these issues, I thank Stephanie Ballard, Matt Frise, and Kathy 
Wassell. For help with earlier drafts, I thank Wayne Alder, Bob Roberts, Zoe Shah, and two 
anonymous referees for Faith and Philosophy. Some of this material was presented at the 
King’s College in New York, where David Talcott impressed upon me concerns that greatly 
shaped the course of this essay.
225CHRISTIANITY AND THE LIFE STORY
Ballard, Brian Scott. 2017. “The Rationality of Faith and the Benefits of Religion.” 
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81: 213–227. https://doi 
.org/10.1007/s11153-016-9599-5
Ballard,  Brian  Scott. 2020. “Content and the Fittingness of Emotion.” The 
Philosophical Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaa074
Ballard, Brian Scott. 2021. “The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience.” 
Emotion Review 13: 25–33. https://doi.org/10.1177/1754073920957082
Baxter, Richard. 1814. The Saints’ Everlasting Rest (Religious Tract Society).
Berggren, Erik Gustav Alexius. 1975. The Psychology of Confession (Brill Archive).
Brown, Peter. 1967. Augustine of Hippo: A Biography (University of California Press).
Bruner, Jerome. 1990. Acts of Meaning (Harvard University Press).
Bunyan, John. 2008. Grace Abounding: With Other Spiritual Autobiographies. Edited 
by John Stachniewski and Anita Pacheco (Oxford University Press).
Burley, Mikel. 2020. “Narrative Philosophy of Religion: Apologetic and Pluralistic 
Orientations.” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88: 5–21. https://
doi.org/10.1007/s11153-019-09730-1
Carroll, Noël. 2007. “Narrative Closure.” Philosophical Studies 135: 1–15. https://
doi.org/10.1007/s11098-007-9097-9
Coxe, A. Cleveland. 1996. The Ante-Nicene Fathers. Edited by Alexander Roberts, 
James  Donaldson, Philip  Schaff, and Henry  Wace. Revised edition. Vol. 3 
(Hendrickson Publishers).
Craig,  William  Lane. 2008. Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth and Apologetics 
(Crossway).
Daley, Brian. 2010. The Hope of the Early Church: A Handbook of Patristic Eschatology 
(Baker Academic).
Davis, Stephen T. 2015. After We Die: Theology, Philosophy, and the Question of Life 
After Death (Baylor University Press).
Dennett, Daniel C. 1992. “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity.” In Self and 
Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives, edited by Frank S. Kessel, P. M. Cole, and 
D. L. Johnson (Erlbaum Associates), 103–115.
Didion, Joan. 1979. The White Album (Macmillan).
Eakin, Paul John. 2008. Living Autobiographically: How We Create Identity in Narrative 
(Cornell University Press).
Etzioni,  Amitai, and David  Carney. 1997. Repentance: A  Comparative Perspective 
(Rowman & Littlefield).
Fischer, John Martin. 2009. Our Stories: Essays on Life, Death, and Free Will (Oxford 
University Press).
Foucault,  Michel. 1997. “Christianity and Confession.” In The Politics of Truth 
(Semiotext(e)), 199–235.
Frei,  Hans  W. 1974. The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A  Study in Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (Yale University Press).
Griswold,  Charles. 2007. Forgiveness: A  Philosophical Exploration (Cambridge 
University Press).
Gusdorf,  Georges. 1980. “Conditions and Limits of Autobiography.” In 
Autobiography: Essays Theoretical and Critical, edited by James Olney (Princeton 
University Press), 28–48.
Hauerwas,  Stanley. 2001. The Hauerwas Reader, edited by John  Berkman and 
Michael Cartwright (Duke University Press).
Hauerwas, Stanley. 2015. The Work of Theology (Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing).
226 Faith and Philosophy
Heffernan, Thomas J. 2012. The Passion of Perpetua and Felicity (Oxford University 
Press).
Hindmarsh,  D.  Bruce. 2005. The Evangelical Conversion Narrative: Spiritual 
Autobiography in Early Modern England (Oxford University Press).
Hutto,  Daniel  D. 2008. Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of 
Understanding Reasons (Bradford).
Johnson, Samuel. 1958. The Works of Samuel Johnson: Diaries, Prayers and Annals. 
Edited by E. McAdam. Vol. 1 (Yale University Press).
Kahane, Guy. 2011. “Should We Want God to Exist?” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 82: 674–696. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00426.x
Kauppinen, Antti. 2012. “Meaningfulness and Time.” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research 84: 345–377. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00490.x
Kempe,  Margery. 2015. The Book of Margery Kempe. Translated by Anthony  Bale 
(Oxford University Press).
Kimmel,  Joseph. 2018. “Comparative Confession: A  Comparative Study of 
Confession in the Writings of Tertullian, Cassian, and Śāntideva.” Journal of 
Interreligious Studies 22: 2–21. https://irstudies.org/index.php/jirs/article 
/view/217
Kraay, Klaas J. 2017. “Invitation to the Axiology of Theism.” In Does God Matter? 
Essays on the Axiology of Theism, edited by Klaas J. Kraay (Routledge), 1–35.
Langland-Hassan, Peter, and Agustin Vicente, eds. 2018. Inner Speech: New Voices. 
(Oxford University Press).
Lewis, Clive Staples. 1946. The Great Divorce (Macmillan).
Loyola,  Ignatius. 2000. The Autobiography of St. Ignatius. Edited by John C. Olin. 
Translated by Joseph F. O’Callaghan (Fordham University Press).
Luhrmann,  Tanya  M. 2012. When God Talks Back: Understanding the American 
Evangelical Relationship with God (Knopf).
MacIntyre,  Alasdair  C. 1983. After Virtue: A  Study in Moral Theory. 2nd ed. 
(University of Notre Dame Press).
Mazzoni, Cristina. 1999. Angela of Foligno’s Memorial (Boydell & Brewer).
McAdams, Dan P. 1988. Power, Intimacy, and the Life Story: Personological Inquiries 
into Identity (Guilford Press).
McClendon,  James. 1986. “Narrative Ethics and Christian Ethics.” Faith and 
Philosophy 3: 383–396. http://doi.org.10.5840/faithphil19863430
McGrath, Alister E. 2003. A Brief History of Heaven (John Wiley and Sons Ltd).
McGrath,  Alister  E. 2019. Narrative Apologetics: Sharing the Relevance, Joy, and 
Wonder of the Christian Faith (Baker Books).
Milona, Michael. 2016. “Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously.” Ethical Theory 
and Moral Practice 19: 897–915. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-016-9716-7
Misch, Georg. 1949. History of Autobiography in Antiquity. Translated by E. W. Dickes. 
Vol. 1 (Routledge and Kegan Paul).
Misch, Georg. 1950. History of Autobiography in Antiquity. Translated by E. W. Dickes. 
Vol. 2 (Routledge and Kegan Paul).
Mortimer,  Robert  C. 1939. The Origins of Private Penance in the Western Church 
(Clarendon).
Niebuhr, H. Richard. 1941. The Meaning of Revelation (Macmillan).
Norwich, Julian of. 2015. Revelations of Divine Love. Translated by Barry Windeatt 
(Oxford University Press).
Nozick, Robert. 1989. “Happiness.” In The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations 
(Touchstone), 99–117.
227CHRISTIANITY AND THE LIFE STORY
Oakley, Thomas P. 1933. “The Origins of Irish Penitential Discipline.” The Catholic 
Historical Review 19: 320–332. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25013193
Oakley, Thomas P. 1938. Celtic Penance: Its Sources, Affiliations and Influence II (Irish 
Ecclesiastical Record).
Oakley, Thomas P. 1941. “The Origins of Private Penance in the Western Church. 
By Rev. R. C. Mortimer.” The American Historical Review 46: 378–379. https://
doi.org/10.1086/ahr/46.2.378
Olney, James. 1998. Memory and Narrative: The Weave of Life-Writing (University of 
Chicago Press).
Osborn, Eric. 2003. Tertullian, First Theologian of the West (Cambridge University 
Press).
Prinz, Jesse J. 2004. Gut Reactions: A Perceptual Theory of Emotion (Oxford University 
Press).
Reynolds, Dwight F. 2001. Interpreting the Self: Autobiography in the Arabic Literary 
Tradition (University of California Press).
Roberts, Robert C. 2003. Emotions: An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology (Cambridge 
University Press).
Roberts,  Robert  C. 2004. “The Blessings of Gratitude: A  Conceptual Analysis.” 
In The Psychology of Gratitude, edited by Michael  E.  McCullough and 
Robert A. Emmons. (Oxford University Press), 58–78.
Roberts, Robert C. 2007. Spiritual Emotions: A Psychology of Christian Virtues (Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing).
Roberts, Robert C. 2019. “Joys: A Brief Moral and Christian Geography.” Faith and 
Philosophy 36: 195–222. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil2019430120
Roesler,  Ulrike. 2020. “Between Self-Expression and Convention: Tibetan 
Reflections on Autobiographical Writing.” Life Writing 17: 163–186. https://doi
.org/10.1080/14484528.2019.1620581
Rosati, Connie S. 2013. “The Story of a Life.” Social Philosophy and Policy 30: 21–50. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052513000022
Rowlandson,  Mary. 1997. The Sovereignty and Goodness of God, Together with the 
Faithfulness of His Promises Displayed. Edited by Neal  Salisbury (Bedford/St. 
Martin’s).
Rudd, Anthony. 2012. Self, Value, and Narrative: A Kierkegaardian Approach (Oxford 
University Press).
Schechtman, Marya. 2007. The Constitution of Selves (Cornell University Press).
Seachris,  Joshua  W. 2009. “The Meaning of Life as Narrative: A  New Proposal 
for Interpreting Philosophy’s ‘Primary’ Question.” Philo 12: 5–23. https://doi 
.org/10.5840/philo20091211
Seachris,  Joshua  W. 2016. “The Meaning of Life and Scripture’s Redemptive-
Historical Narrative: Illuminating Convergences.” In God and Meaning: 
New Essays, edited by Joshua  W.  Seachris and Stewart  Goetz (Bloomsbury 
Academic), 13–34.
Strawson,  Galen. 2004. “Against Narrativity.” Ratio 17: 428–452. https://doi 
.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2004.00264.x
Strawson, Galen. 2007. “Episodic Ethics.” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplements 
60: 85–116. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1358246100009620
Stump, Eleonore. 2010. Wandering in Darkness: Narrative and the Problem of Suffering 
(Oxford University Press).
Taylor, Charles. 1992. Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge 
University Press).
228 Faith and Philosophy
Taylor, Chloë. 2010. The Culture of Confession from Augustine to Foucault (Routledge).
Tentler, Thomas N. 1977. Sin and Confession on the Eve of the Reformation (Princeton 
University Press).
Teresa of Avila. 1957. The Life of Saint Teresa of Avila by Herself. Translated by 
J. M. Cohen. (Penguin Classics).
Tolkien, John Ronald Reuel. 1998. “Leaf by Niggle.” In Tales from the Perilous Realm 
(HarperCollins), 285–312.
Trites, Alison A. 2004. The New Testament Concept of Witness (Cambridge University 
Press).
Van Inwagen, Peter. 2018. “I Look for the Resurrection of the Dead and the Life of 
the World to Come.” In The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, edited by 
Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge, and J. P. Moreland (Wiley-Blackwell).
Velleman, J. David. 1991. “Well-Being and Time.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72: 
48–77. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0114.1991.tb00410.x
Velleman, J. David. 2005. “The Self as Narrator.” In Autonomy and the Challenges to 
Liberalism: New Essays, edited by Joel Anderson and John Christman (Cambridge 
University Press), 56–76.
Velleman, J. David. 2020. On Being Me (Princeton University Press).
Walls, Jerry L. 2002. Heaven: The Logic of Eternal Joy (Oxford University Press).
Wang,  Ying. 2015. “Medieval Chinese Autobiographical Writing: The Self-
Written Epitaph.” The Medieval History Journal 18: 305–345. https://doi 
.org/10.1177/0971945815602083
Watkins, Oscar Daniel. 1920. A History of Penance, Being a Study of Authorities (A) for 
the Whole Church to AD 450, (B) for the Western Church from AD 450 to AD 1215. 
Vol. 1 (Longmans, Green and Company).
White, Carolinne. 1996. Gregory of Nazianzus: Autobiographical Poems (Cambridge 
University Press).
Williams, Bernard. 2002. Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton 
University Press).
Williams, Clifford. 2011. Existential Reasons for Belief in God: A Defense of Desires and 
Emotions for Faith (InterVarsity Press).
Wu, Pei-yi. 1990. The Confucian’s Progress: Autobiographical Writings in Traditional 
China. (Princeton University Press).
